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Higher Wages in Exporting Firms: 
Self-Selection, Export Effect, or Both? 
First Evidence from German Linked Employer-Employee Data 
 
While it is a stylized fact that exporting firms pay higher wages than non-exporting firms, the 
direction of the link between exporting and wages is less clear. Using a rich set of German 
linked employer-employee panel data we follow over time plants that start to export. We 
show that the exporter wage premium does already exist in the years before firms start to 
export, and that it does not increase in the following years. Higher wages in exporting firms 
are thus due to self-selection of more productive, better paying firms into export markets; 
they are not caused by export activities. 
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 1. Motivation 
Exporting firms pay higher wages than firms that serve the national market only. This 
is one of the stylized facts from the emerging literature on the micro-econometrics of 
international firm activities. It was pointed out by Bernard and Jensen (1995) in their 
pioneering Brookings Paper, and it has been confirmed in a large number of studies 
(surveyed in Schank, Schnabel and Wagner, 2007) with firm level data from many 
different countries. Some recent studies using linked employer-employee data have 
demonstrated that this positive link between export activities and the level of wages 
paid by a firm can even be found after controlling for observed and unobserved 
characteristics of both the employer and the employees.
1
An issue that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been investigated 
empirically with linked employer-employee data is the sequencing behind the 
correlation of export activities and higher wages at the firm level. Does exporting lead 
to a wage premium? Or did exporting firms pay a wage premium even before they 
started to export? Theoretical considerations point to possible links in both directions 
that are by no means mutually exclusive: 
-  Hypothesis 1 (H1):  The observed exporter wage premium reflects self-
selection of more productive firms with higher wages into export markets. The recent 
literature on exporting by heterogeneous firms, pioneered by Melitz (2003) and 
surveyed by Greeneway and Kneller (2007), argues that only the more productive 
firms in an industry can bear the extra costs of entering foreign markets. In these 
models, exporters are more productive than non-exporters, and we observe self-
selection of more productive firms into export activities, with the ex-ante more 
                                                 
1 See Munch and Skaksen (2006) for Denmark, Alcalá and Hernández (2007) for Spain, and Schank, 
Schnabel and Wagner (2007) for Germany. Note, however, that Breau and Rigby (2006) find no wage 
difference between exporting and non-exporting plants after controlling for worker characteristics for 
the Los Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. productive firms becoming exporters. If wages are higher in more productive firms – 
due to higher profits and rent-sharing, or because higher (efficiency) wages cause 
higher productivity (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1986)
2 – and if more productive firms 
self-select into export markets, we expect that these future exporters already paid a 
wage premium to the workers ex-ante, i.e. before they started to export. 
-  Hypothesis 2 (H2):  Exporting makes firms more productive and leads to 
higher wages. This hypothesis found in the literature on exports and productivity 
points to the role of learning-by-exporting (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and 
Bernard and Wagner, 1997). Knowledge flows from international buyers and 
competitors help to improve the post-entry performance of export starters. 
Furthermore, firms participating in international markets are exposed to more intense 
competition and must improve faster than firms which only sell their products 
domestically. Exporting thus makes firms more productive. If wages are higher in 
more productive firms due to higher profits and rent-sharing, we may expect that 
exporting leads to higher wages. More specifically, this hypothesis predicts that after 
                                                 
2 Egger and Kreikemeier (2007) develop a model that incorporates workers’ fair wage preferences into 
a general equilibrium framework à la Melitz (2003). They modify the original Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
fair wage – effort mechanism by introducing a rent-sharing motive as a determinant of workers’ fair 
wage preferences, assuming that the wage considered to be fair depends, among others, on the 
productivity level and thus on the performance of the firm. Identical workers then earn different wages 
in equilibrium, and higher wages are paid to employees working in more productive firms. They refer to 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) who point out that the idea of gift exchange which is central to the fair wage 
– effort hypothesis implies exactly this. The theory of a positive correlation between productivity levels, 
profits and wages is well in line with empirical findings on rent-sharing in firms, as pointed out by 
Egger and Kreikemeier (2007). A different approach of introducing efficiency wages into 
heterogeneous firms models of the Melitz (2003) type is followed by Davis and Harrigan (2007) who 
argue that heterogeneity in the ability of firms to monitor effort leads to different wages for identical 
workers in equilibrium, following the variant of the efficiency wage theory put forward by Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984). If export starters are larger than non-exporters in the years before the start, and if 
monitoring costs are systematically higher in larger firms, this might lead to ex-ante wage differentials 
for identical workers in future export starters and non-exporters. 
  2a firm has started to export, the wages of its employees increase stronger than the 
wages of employees who work in firms that continue to produce for the national 
market only, leading to an ex-post exporter wage premium. 
There is ample empirical evidence on the relationship between productivity 
and exporting, showing substantial exporter productivity premia and many findings in 
favor of the self-selection hypothesis, but much fewer results in favor of the learning-
by-exporting hypothesis.
3 What is missing, however, are convincing empirical studies 
on the sequencing and the direction of the link between exporting and wages. One 
reason for this gap in the literature is the lack of suitable data. Since empirical studies 
of exporter wage differentials must control for observed and unobserved 
characteristics of both employers and employees that might determine wages 
besides exporting, they have to use linked employer-employee (LEE) panel data. To 
investigate the relevance of both the self-selection hypothesis and the learning-by-
exporting hypothesis in explaining exporter wage differentials, LEE data are needed 
which cover a period that is long enough to follow cohorts of firms over a couple of 
years before and after they start to export, and which can be used to test for ex-ante 
and ex-post wage differentials. Apparently, such LEE data were not available until 
recently. 
Using suitable LEE data for Germany, a leading actor on the world market for 
goods,  this paper contributes to the literature by testing the two hypotheses 
mentioned above on the direction of the link between exporting and wages. For the 
period 1994 to 2005, we show that the exporter wage premium does already exist in 
the years before firms start to export, and that it does not increase in the years after 
exporting started. According to our findings, higher wages in exporting firms are due 
                                                 
3 See Wagner (2007) for a survey, and The International Study Group on Exports and Productivity 
(2007) for recent comparable results for 14 countries. 
  3to self-selection of more productive, better paying firms into export markets, but they 
are not caused by export activities. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the LEE 
data. Section 3 presents the results of our empirical investigation, and section 4 
concludes. 
 
2.  The German linked employer-employee data 
The dataset used in the subsequent empirical analyses is the German LIAB, i.e. the 
linked employer-employee dataset of the Institute for Employment Research (Institut 
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB). The LIAB combines the Employment 
Statistics of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) 
with plant-level data from the IAB Establishment Panel. For detailed information on 
the LIAB, see Alda, Bender and Gartner (2005). 
The employee side of our dataset is the Employment Statistics, covering all 
employees and trainees subject to social security. They exclude, among others, the 
self-employed, family workers, a subgroup of civil servants (“Beamte”), students 
enrolled in higher education, and those in marginal employment. The employment 
statistics cover nearly 80 percent of all employed persons in western Germany and 
about 85 percent of employees in eastern Germany. They are collected by the social 
insurance institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced in 1973 
and are made available to the Federal Employment Agency. Notifications are 
prescribed at the beginning and at the end of a person’s employment in a plant. In 
addition, an annual report for each employee is compulsory at the end of a year. 
Misreporting is legally sanctioned. The employment statistics contain information on 
an employee's occupation, the occupational status, and gross earnings up to the 
  4contribution assessment ceiling,
4 as well as on individual characteristics like sex, 
age, nationality, marital status, and qualification. Each personnel record also contains 
the establishment identifier, the industry, and the size of the plant. 
The employer side of our dataset is given by the IAB Establishment Panel, a 
random sample of establishments that is drawn from a stratified sample of the plants 
included in the Employment Statistics, where the strata are defined over industries 
and plant sizes (large plants are oversampled). In 1993, the panel started with 4,265 
plants, covering 0.27 percent of all plants in western Germany (2 million) and 11 
percent of total employment (29 million). In 1996, the establishment panel also 
started in eastern Germany with 4,313 establishments representing 1.1 percent of all 
plants (391,000) and 11 percent of total employment (6 million). The IAB 
Establishment Panel has been set up for the needs of the Federal Employment 
Agency to provide further information about the demand side of the labor market. 
Therefore, detailed information on the composition of the workforce and its 
development through time constitutes a major part of the questionnaire. Further 
questions include information on training and further education, wages, working time, 
business activities, establishment policies, and general information about the plant. 
The LIAB is created by linking the Employment Statistics and the IAB 
Establishment Panel through a plant identifier which is available in both data sets.
5 
                                                 
4 For daily gross wages, the ceiling in 2000, for example, is at € 143.92 for western and at € 118.81 for 
eastern Germany. In our regression sample, 8.2 (4.3) percent of the wage observations in western 
(eastern) Germany are censored. In order to cope with a potential bias due to censoring, we also 
conducted analyses not reported here (but available on request) which show that restricting the 
sample to uncensored observations does not change our conclusions. 
5 The LIAB data are confidential but not exclusive. They are available for non-commercial research by 
visiting the research data center of the German Federal Employment Agency at the IAB in Nuremberg, 
Germany. Researchers interested in replications or extensions of our work may contact the first author 
(e-mail: thorsten.schank@wiso.uni-erlangen.de) for a copy of the Stata do-files used to produce the 
results reported here. 
  5Because the Employment Statistics is spell-based (one record for each employment 
spell), the combined data is potentially complex. To simplify, we select all (full-time) 
workers in the employment statistics who are employed by the surveyed plants on 
June 30th in a year. This yields an unbalanced annual panel of workers together with 
detailed information on the plants in which they work, which is unique for Germany. 
We are able to use the years 1994 to 2005, and we focus on the private sector 
(excluding agriculture). 
 
3. Empirical  investigation 
The core of our empirical strategy to test for the validity of the two hypotheses on 
export activities and higher wages consists in comparing over time wages in plants 
that start to export with wages in plants that continue to produce for the national 
market only. We start at a point in time when both groups of plants did not export, 
and end at a point in time when some of these firms have exported for a while. Using 
observation periods of six years, we define export starters as plants that do not 
export in the first three years (t = 1, 2, 3), but start to export in year t = 4 and continue 
to export in the years t = 5 and t = 6; non-exporters are plants that do not export in 
any of the years t = 1, …, 6. 
 
3.1 Descriptive  statistics 
Using the LIAB data described in Section 2 above, the six-year-windows considered 
here are 1994 to 1999, 1995 to 2000, …, 2000 to 2005. Data for export starters and 
non-exporters were pooled over these seven cohorts, and wages and sales were 
deflated. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for both groups of plants and each year 
t = 1, …, 6. 
 
  6[Table 1 near here] 
 
The sample available for our empirical investigation consists of 57 export 
starters and 3,139 non-exporters. A comparison of plants from both groups with 
regard to size (number of employees), labor productivity (sales per employee) and 
wages paid (average daily wage) reveals that export starters are on average larger, 
more productive, and better paying in each year. Compared to non-exporters, export 
starters have on average about three times the number of employees, and pay 
wages that are about 30 percent higher. However, while the difference in wages, 
which is the main focus of this study, is statistically highly significant, the difference in 
size is only marginally significant, and the difference in productivity is insignificant. 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 are in line with the first 
hypothesis (H1) according to which higher wages in exporting firms are due to self-
selection of more productive and better paying firms into export markets – labor 
productivity and daily wages are higher in future export starters compared to non-
exporters even in the years before the start (although the difference in average 
productivity is not statistically significant at any conventional level). In contrast, we 
find no evidence to support the second hypothesis (H2) which argues that exporting 
increases productivity and thus wages due to learning-by-exporting. Changes in labor 
productivity and in the daily wage between t = 3 and t = 6 do not differ in a 
statistically significant way between export starters and non-exporters. 
 
3.2  Plant level regressions 
While providing interesting information, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 
cannot be considered as a basis for a convincing test of the two hypotheses H1 and 
H2. Since an exporter wage premium is a positive difference between the wages paid 
  7to employees in exporting and non-exporting firms after controlling for differences in 
other variables than exporting that determine wages, the rest of the empirical 
investigation is concerned with controlling for these influences on wages. 
As a first step, we look at the difference in the plant average of daily wages 
between export starters and non-exporters over time, controlling for plant 
characteristics that can be expected to be related to the average wage level of a 
plant (including plant size, the presence or not of a works council, the use of new 
production technology, location in western or eastern Germany, various measures for 
the average qualification of the workforce, and dummies for industries, regions, and 
years). Results based on data for 3,196 plants are reported in column 1 of Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 near here] 
 
The coefficient of the exporter-starter dummy variable (see row 1 of Table 2) 
shows that the average daily wage paid by export starters is 7 percent higher than in 
a comparable non-exporting plant in t = 1, i.e. three years before the export starts. 
This difference is both statistically significant and of a relevant order of magnitude 
from an economic point of view.
6 Results reported in column 3 of Table 2 show that 
the same holds for labor productivity. Controlling for all plant characteristics used in 
the wage regression, the estimated productivity premium for export starters three 
years before the start is 19.8 percent. The statistically insignificant coefficients of the 
interaction terms of the export starter dummy variable and the dummy variables for t 
= 2 to t = 6 show that neither the difference in the average wage nor the difference in 
the average productivity changes over the years t=2 to t=6. 
                                                 
6 The control variables all have the expected signs, and most of them are statistically significant. Since 
the focus of this paper is on the exporter wage premium, we do not comment on the results for the 
control variables here and in other regressions. 
  8These results are in line with our hypothesis H1 – plants with higher wages 
(and a higher productivity) self-select into export markets. Contrary to this, hypothesis 
H2 – that wages (and productivity) increase after starting to export due to learning-
by-exporting effects – is not supported. Although in the wage regression and in the 
productivity regression five out of six point estimates of the interaction terms of the 
export starter dummy variable and the dummy variables for t = 4 to t = 6 are positive, 
none of them is statistically significantly different from zero at a usual error level. 
These findings are fully in line with the results from the descriptive statistics reported 
in Table 1. 
Next, we apply an alternative approach to test for wage (and productivity) 
enhancing effects of starting to export. This is motivated by the problem that faster 
wage growth of plants which have just entered the export market (compared to plants 
that keep selling their products on the domestic market only) would not necessarily 
reflect a causal effect of exporting on wages. It could well be the case that better 
paying (and more productive) firms self-select into the export-starting group, but 
would have experienced higher wage growth even without starting to export. 
However, we cannot observe the latter scenario (i.e. the wage developments of 
today’s export starters if they had not started to export), which is the well-known 
problem of the missing counterfactual situation.
7
This closely resembles a situation familiar from the evaluation of active labor 
market programs (or any other form of treatment of units): If participants, or treated 
units, are not selected randomly from a population but are selected or self-select 
according to certain criteria, the effect of a treatment cannot be evaluated by 
comparing the average performance of the treated and the non-treated. Since each 
                                                 
7 Although the regression results discussed above do not show a difference in wage growth between 
export starters and non-starters, these estimates may be biased due to the self-selection of export 
starters. 
  9unit (plant or person) either did participate or not, we lack the required information 
about its performance in the counterfactual situation. A way out is to construct a 
control group in such a way that every treated unit is matched to an untreated unit 
that was as similar as possible (ideally, identical) at the time before the treatment. 
Differences between the two groups (the treated, and the matched non-treated) after 
the treatment can then be attributed to the treatment (for a comprehensive 
discussion, see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). The use of a matching 
approach to search for effects of starting to export on wages (and other dimensions 
of firm performance, including productivity) has been pioneered by Wagner (2002), 
and it has been used in a growing number of empirical studies (surveyed in Wagner, 
2007) ever since. 
In the present study, export starters in year t=4 were matched with “statistical 
twins” from the large group of non-exporters, based on characteristics of the plants in 
t = 1 (three years before the starters begin to export). Matching was implemented by 
nearest neighbour propensity score matching.
8 The propensity score was estimated 
from a probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether or not a plant is an 
export starter in year t=4 on a set of variables (all measured at t = 1) that are 
considered as determinants of the probability to start to export and are related to the 
average wage paid in the firm. Details are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. The 
balancing property (which requires an absence of statistically significant differences 
between the treatment group and the control group in the covariates after matching) 
is satisfied. The differences in the means of the variables used to compute the 
propensity score were never statistically significant between the starters and the 
matched non-starters (see Table A2 in the Appendix). The common support condition 
                                                 
8 Alternative matching procedures have also been carried out (using three and five nearest neighbors, 
kernel matching), but the (unreported) results were similar to those discussed in the next section. 
  10(which requires that the propensity score of a treated observation is neither higher 
than the maximum nor less than the minimum propensity score of the controls) was 
imposed by dropping export starters whose propensity score is higher than the 
maximum or lower than the minimum propensity score of the non-exporters. 
This matching approach leads to 48 (out of 57) export starters for which a non-
exporting twin-plant could be found. These 48 pairs constitute our so-called matched 
sample made up of 96 plants. The plant-level regressions of average daily wages 
and of sales per employee discussed above were repeated for data from this 
matched sample; results are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2. By construction 
(due to the successful matching) neither wages nor productivity differ significantly 
between export starters and non-exporting plants in t = 1, and the same holds for the 
other years before the export start in t = 4. 
In the matched sample, the estimated regression coefficients of the interaction 
terms of the export starter dummy variable with the dummy variables for the years t = 
4, t = 5 and t = 6 turn out to be statistically insignificant at any conventional level in 
both the wage and the productivity regression. Therefore, in line with the findings 
from the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 and from the regressions using the 
full sample of plants reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2, we find no evidence for 
hypothesis H2 which argues that exporting increases productivity and thus wages 
due to learning-by-exporting. 
 
3.3 Individual  level wage regressions 
The plant level estimations presented in Section 3.2 may suffer from aggregation bias 
since individual heterogeneity which influences wages cannot be controlled for. 
Therefore, we replicate the empirical investigation for wages using data at the 
individual level, controlling for both observed employer and employee 
  11characteristics.
9 Like in the plant level analysis we consider two samples of plants – 
the full sample of all plants, and the matched sample made up of export starters and 
matched non-exporters.  
We also take into account that the selection effect only controls for time-
invariant differences between export starters and non-starters and their employees. 
Any changes in the workforce (due to hirings and separations) are by definition not 
absorbed by the selection effect. If quitters and joiners are non-random with respect 
to the introduction of the export activity, we may obtain a biased estimate of our 
hypothesis  H2. We control for this by (additionally) looking only at wages of 
individuals who remain in the respective plant in all six years observed (stayers). 
 
[Table 3 near here] 
 
Results for the full sample of 3,196 plants and all 351,157 employees, 
meaning a total of 1,270,089 observations, are reported in column 1 of Table 3. The 
estimated coefficient of the export starter dummy variable is positive and highly 
statistically significant. It is also large from an economic point of view, pointing to an 
export starter wage differential of 9 percent in t = 1 (i.e. three years before the start). 
Although this differential reduces slightly in t = 2, these results are strongly in favor of 
hypothesis H1 according to which higher wages in exporting firms are due to self-
selection of better paying firms into export markets. This finding is corroborated by 
the results for the same empirical model estimated for stayers only (see column 2 of 
Table 3), where an export starter wage premium of 7.7 percent is found.
10
                                                 
9 Due to the lack of information for productivity at the individual level this replication is possible for the 
wage equations only. 
10 As before, the control variables all have the expected signs, and most of them are statistically 
significant. 
  12In contrast, hypothesis H2 (according to which wages and productivity 
increase after starting to export due to learning-by-exporting effects) is not supported 
by our data. Neither in the estimations based on all employees nor in the regressions 
including stayers only the interaction terms of the export starter dummy variable and 
the dummy variables for the years t = 4, t = 5 and t = 6 are ever positive and 
statistically significant. In fact, five of the six coefficients are negative, and wages do 
even decrease in the year of the export start compared to wages earned by 
employees with the same characteristics in plants with the same characteristics 
which continue to produce for the national market only. 
Finally, we turn to the results for all employees and for the stayers in the 
matched sample. These are reported in columns 3 and 4, respectively, of Table 3. 
Again, we do not find any empirical evidence in favor of a wage increase after 
starting to export. Higher wages in exporting plants thus do not seem to be induced 
by export activities. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Using a rich set of German linked employer-employee panel data, we have 
demonstrated that the exporter wage premium does already exist in the years before 
plants start to export, and that it does not increase in the years after exporting 
started. According to our results, higher wages in exporting plants that are found after 
controlling for observed and unobserved employer and employee characteristics are 
due to self-selection of more productive, better paying plants into export markets. 
This empirical finding is in accordance with the recent theoretical literature on 
exporting by heterogeneous firms (pioneered by Melitz 2003) which postulates that 
only the more productive firms in an industry can bear the extra costs of entering 
foreign markets. 
  13Our empirical results imply that the so-called exporter wage premium is 
labeled misleadingly since it may not be caused by export activities. At least in the 
case of Germany, one of the major exporting countries in the world, exporting does 
not seem to make firms more productive and lead to higher wages. It would be 
interesting to see whether this finding can be replicated for other countries using 
linked employer-employee panel data. These sort of data provide information that 
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  16Table 1: Descriptive statistics for export starters and non-exporters, all plants  
 Export  starters
(N = 57)
Non-exporters
(N = 3,139) 
Prob-value for H0: 
Diff. of means = 0 
  Mean Mean  
Plant size 
(number of persons) 
 
t = 1  319.32 109.27 0.07 
t = 2  312.35 104.68 0.06 
t = 3  289.19 101.84 0.07 
t = 4  289.04  99.66 0.06 
t = 5  288.68 97.65 0.05 
t = 6  270.90 95.05 0.06 
      
Yearly sales per employee 
(in thousands of €)       
t = 1  140.69 120.87 0.25 
t = 2  146.47 121.72 0.29 
t = 3  146.25 119.16 0.19 
t = 4  134.94 121.33 0.36 
t = 5  127.32 122.38 0.76 
t = 6  150.75 125.98 0.36 
      
Average daily wage (in €)       
t = 1  77.75 60.32 0.00 
t = 2  77.86 60.34 0.00 
t = 3  79.81 61.12 0.00 
t = 4  79.98 61.46 0.00 
t = 5  79.81 61.22 0.00 
t = 6  79.96 60.62 0.00 
   
Growth rates between 
t = 3 and t = 6, in % 
 
   
   Plant size  
   (number of persons) 
 
27.42 -0.65 0.22 
   Yearly sales per   
   employee  
   (in thousands of €) 
1.40 8.58 0.27 
   
   Average daily wage 
   (in €) 
-0.01 -0.24 0.85 
Sample is lower for sales per employee due to missing values. Export starters are plants 
which do not export in the first three years (t = 1, 2, 3), but export in the last three years (t = 
4, 5, 6). Non-exporters do not export in any year. Wages and sales are deflated by the 
aggregate consumer price index. t = 1,… , 6 refers to a specific year in the 6-year-window a 
plant is observed. Start (end) years for these windows vary across plants between 1994 
(1999) and 2000 (2005). 
  17Table 2: Plant-level regressions of wages and labor productivity (OLS); Germany 
Dependent variable:  Logarithm of (plant 
average of) daily wage 
Logarithm of sales per 
employee 
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  18   Workers with apprenticeship 









   Workers with technical college   









   Workers with university 









   Workers with unreported   

























      
Observations  18,800 576  16,723 542 
Plants  3,196 96  3,077 96 
R
2 0.650 0.889 0.453 0.739 
Regressions also include 36 sectoral dummies, 9 urbanisation dummies, 15 regional 
dummies, 11 year dummies as well as 5 dummies for the respective periods t. |t|-statistics in 
parentheses, based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant-level. Full 
sample refers to all observations with no missing values in the covariates. Matched sample 
refers to observations from plants which have been selected via nearest neighbor propensity 
score matching, where the propensity score has been obtained from a probit on export-
starting. 
 
  19Table 3: Individual level wage regressions (OLS); Germany 
   (Dependent variable: logarithm of daily wage) 
  Full sample Matched sample 
Explanatory  variables  All Stayers  All Stayers 
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Without apprenticeship or Abitur 
(ref.  group)      
Apprenticeship, no Abitur 









No Apprenticeship, with Abitur 









Apprenticeship and Abitur  0.261 0.243 0.224 0.223 
  20(dummy: 1 = yes)  [18.74]***  [16.08]***  [7.70]***  [9.03]*** 
Technical college degree 





























Master craftsman, foreman 



















    
Observations 1,270,089  709,536  124,062  78,420 
Employees 351,157  118,256  30,588  13,070 
Plants 3,196  2,745  96  96 
R
2 0.622 0.600 0.681 0.696 
Regressions also include 36 sectoral dummies, 9 urbanisation dummies, 15 regional 
dummies, 11 year dummies as well as 5 dummies for the respective periods t. |t|-statistics in 
parentheses, based on robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the plant-level. Full 
sample refers to all observations with no missing values in the covariates. Matched sample 
refers to observations of employees from plants which have been selected via nearest 
neighbor propensity score matching, where the propensity score has been obtained from a 
probit on export-starting. All comprise stayers (workers which work for the respective plant in 
all six years of the data window) as well as employees which join/leave the plant during the 
observed six years. 
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Table A1: Determinants of export-starting, probit estimation; Germany  
     (Dependent variable is a dummy for export starters: 1 = yes) 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient   Z-value 
Logarithm of average wage  1.363   [2.77]*** 
Logarithm of total sales per employee  0.093   [0.67] 
Logarithm of establishment size 
(number of employees) 
0.952  [3.24]*** 
Squared logarithm of establishment 
size 
-0.067  [2.17]** 
Works council (dummy: 1= yes)  0.173   [0.73] 
Collective agreement (reference: no 
collective agreement) 
  
   at sectoral level (dummy: 1= yes)  -0.422   [1.92]* 
   at firm level (dummy: 1= yes)  0.129   [0.49] 
Plant belongs to a larger unit 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
-0.118  [0.51] 
New production technology  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.083  [0.42] 
Eastern Germany (dummy: 1= yes)  0.744   [2.53]** 
Average age of employees (in years)  -0.275   [1.39] 
Average age squared
 (divided by 100)  0.322   [1.28] 
Average tenure of employees   0.053   [0.60] 
Average tenure squared (divided by 
100) 
-0.452  [0.77] 
Proportion within total workforce of 
plant: 
  
   Female workers  0.545   [1.22] 
   Workers with  
   apprenticeship, no Abitur  
-0.434  [1.26] 
   Workers without 
   apprenticeship, with Abitur  
3.935  [0.72] 
   Workers with 
   apprenticeship and Abitur  
0.18  [0.17] 
   Workers with technical 
   college degree  
-0.14  [0.14] 
   Workers with university  
   degree 
0.026  [0.03] 
   Master craftsman     0.483   [0.25] 
   Constant  -10.453   [.] 
  
Number of plants  2,182  
X
2(48) 164.65   *** 
Pseudo-R
2 0.346  
All covariates dated at t=1. Regressions also include sectoral and year dummies. */**/*** 
denotes statistical significance at the 10/5/1 % level. Number of plants is lower than the 
respective figure reported in Tables 2/3 (3,196), since the latter also comprise plants which 
have missing values in the first year (and thus do not enter the probit regression), but with 
complete information in at least one of the other years. 
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(N = 48) 
Non-
exporters
(N = 48) 
P-value
a
Logarithm of average wage  4.317 4.042 0.00 4.287  4.352 0.27
Logarithm of total sales per 
employee 
12.294 11.837 0.00 12.315 12.338 0.89
Establishment size (number 
of employees) 
4.405 3.068 0.00 4.428 4.590 0.62
Works council 
(dummy: 1= yes) 
0.554 0.234 0.00 0.542 0.563 0.84
Collective agreement at the 
sectoral level  
(dummy: 1= yes) 
0.500 0.504 0.95 0.479 0.625 0.15
Collective agreement at the 
firm level  (dummy: 1= yes) 
0.143 0.106 0.44 0.167 0.167 1.00
Plant belongs to a larger unit 
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.232 0.124 0.06 0.208 0.208 1.00
New production technology  
(dummy: 1 = yes) 
0.768 0.704 0.27 0.771 0.792 0.81
Eastern Germany (dummy: 
1= yes) 
0.446 0.504 0.40 0.479 0.417 0.54
Average age of employees 
(in years) 
39.933 38.589 0.04 39.793 39.935 0.86
Average Tenure of 
employees  
16.160 15.246 0.08 16.005 16.092 0.89
Proportion within total 
workforce of plant: 
         
   Female workers  0.264 0.375 0.00 0.275  0.251 0.59
   Workers with  
   apprenticeship, no Abitur  
0.007 0.003 0.18 0.005 0.007 0.56
   Workers without 
   apprenticeship, with Abitur  
0.032 0.024 0.33 0.036 0.035 0.95
   Workers with   
   apprenticeship and Abitur  
0.050 0.024 0.04 0.043 0.064 0.39
   Workers with technical 
   college degree  
0.062 0.027 0.10 0.045 0.048 0.88
   Workers with university   
   degree 
0.021 0.023 0.78 0.024 0.031 0.51
   Master craftsman     0.264 0.375 0.00 0.275  0.251 0.59
aTwo-sample t-test (with unequal variance) of the hypothesis that the difference in the 
mean is equal to zero. 
bInformation refers to the first year a plant is observed (t = 1), i.e. three years before the 
(potential) export-start. Sample may be lower for some variables due to missing values. 
c Numbers differ slightly from those reported in Table 1 (57 resp. 3,139) since the latter 
also include plants which have missing values in covariates in t=1. 
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